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Part I - A Legal Analysis

For as long as competition has existed, individuals have attempted to gain a leg up
on their adversaries. This is especially true in the sport of baseball, which has seen a long
history of such behavior. Whether this involved pitchers doctoring baseballs or hitters
corking bats, enhancing ones performance through artificial means has always been an
objective for some players. With the revelation that Baseball Hall of Famers Willie Mays
and Hank Aaron used amphetamines as early as the 1960's, performance enhancing drugs
(PEDs) have been in the game for around fifty years. 1 Of course when most people refer
to baseball's "Steroid Era" they mean the period of time from the late 1980's until the
mid-2000's, when anabolic steroid use pervaded the sport. 2 Major League Baseball has
since cleaned up its act by instituting its Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program,
but that hasn't stopped some players from using performance enhancing drugs in
violation of federal law and baseball policy. 3 Over the past decade baseball players have
cheated, testified in front of Congress, lied to Congress, and have been tried for offenses
related to their alleged use of performance enhancing drugs. These trials have ultimately
proved fruitless as the government has failed to secure a perjury conviction while wasting
large sums of taxpayer money in the process.

Since Major League Baseball lacks

subpoena power, there's only so much they can do to stop tnulti-millionaires who have
the desire to gain any advantage they can. 4 In the wake of a recent investigative report
which has tied more than twenty MLB players to a Miami based anti-aging clinic, which

1

T.J. Quinn, The Hall of Fame: Why I Stopped Voting, 2012, available athttp://espn.go.com/mlb/story
(last visited on May 14, 2013).
2
George Mitchell, Report to the Commissioner of Baseball of an Independent Investigation Into the
Illegal Use ofSteroids and Other Performance Enhancing Substances by Players in Major League
Baseball, 2007, available at http: //files.mlb.com/mitchrpt.pdf (last visited on May 14, 2013).
3 See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
4 See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
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was providing them with banned substances, 5 it is appropriate to revisit the topic of
performance enhancing drugs in baseball through a legal and moral analysis.
In order to properly evaluate possible future regulation of performance enhancing
drugs in baseball, it is important to focus on the legal considerations of the past which
gave rise to this current environment. The issue of performance enhancing drugs in
baseball emerged after players had been organized into unions that engaged in collective
bargaining under the umbrella of the National Labor Relations Act. 6 The Major League
Baseball Players Association (MLBP A) staunchly opposed initiatives taken by
commissioners to address drug problems in the sport citing privacy concerns, both in
regards to players who were found to have abused drugs (illegal narcotics and
performance enhancing) and about a league institution of mandatory drug testing. 7 The
legal and contractual framework for collective bargaining furnished an effective base for
the union and players to challenge these initiatives, as drug testing has been subject to
collective bargaining in Major League Baseball since 1986. 8 As a result, due to
suspected anabolic steroid use by players, then-Commissioner Fay Vincent sent out a
memo to each team and their players which prohibited the possession, sale, or use of any
illegal drugs, including steroids. 9 The memo did not include a drug testing program,
because the MLBP A would have had to agree to this through collective bargaining, but it
5 Tim Elfrink, A Miami Clinic Supplies Drugs to Sports' Biggest Names, 2013, available at
http: I /www.miaminewtimes.com /2013-01-31 /news /a- rod-and-doping-a-miami-clinic-suppliesdrugs-to-sports-biggest-names (last visited on May 14, 2013).
6 The decision that gave professional athletes their rights under labor law was rendered in a union
certification application by umpires in THE AMERICAN LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL
CLUBS & ASS'N OF NATIONAL BASEBALL LEAGUE UMPIRES. National Labor Relations Board, 1969.
180 N.L.R.B. 190.
7 Paul Weiler & Gary Roberts, Sports And The Law, Second Edition.
a See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
9 David Epstein, The Rules, The Law, The Reality: A primer on baseball's steroid policy through the
years, 2009, available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1151761/
(last visited on May 14, 2013).
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did set out treatment and penalty guidelines. 10 The MLBPA, widely considered to be one
of the strongest unions in the United States, 11 was able to successfully deflect subsequent
talk of a drug testing program for over a decade after Fay Vincent altered baseball's drug
policy to include prohibiting anabolic steroids. 12
Anabolic steroids are listed as controlled substances under the Federal Controlled
Substances Act. 13 Since 2004, the dietary supplement androstenedione and other steroid
precursors have been as well. 14 That means that it is illegal to use or possess steroids
without a valid physician's prescription. Violations of this law carry penalties similar to
those applicable to the illegal use or possession of narcotics. 15 Human Growth Hormone
(HGH) is a prescription medication. 16 It is illegal to use a prescription for HGH except
for very limited purposes. 17 HGH has never been approved for cosmetic or anti-aging
uses, or to improve athletic performance. 18 Issuing a prescription for HGH for any of
these unauthorized purposes is a violation of federallaw. 19 It defies logic that there was
not mandatory random drug testing in baseball until the 2002 Basic Agreement, when it
was accepted through collective bargaining between the MLBP A and Major League
Baseball.

Essentially, the opposition by the player's union delayed the adoption of

mandatory random drug testing in Major League Baseball for nearly twenty years. 20 It

See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
Major League Baseball Players Association, available at http://mlb.mlb.com/pa!info/history.jsp
(last visited on May 14, 2013).
12 See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
n See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
14 Steroid precursors, while not technically a steroid, essentially functions as an anabolic steroid once
it is ingested.
1s See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
16 See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
17 See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
1s See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
19 See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
2o See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
1o

11
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was only after the players, the union, and Major League Baseball felt external pressure,
brought about from the negative publicity generated by the steroid era, that drug testing
was adopted and an independent investigation into steroid use in baseball was conducted
by former Senator George Mitchell.
The steroid era was in part fostered and cultivated by Major League Baseball
turning a blind eye to the offenses that were taking place even though, in retrospect, they
should have been apparent. 21 Baseball lost many of its diehard fans after a work stoppage
resulted in the cancelation of the end of the 1994 season, including the postseason and
World Series. 22 There was widespread outrage in the sports world and amongst fans in
general. As a result, Major League Baseball was desperate to get back in everyone's
good graces. They found an opportunity to capitalize on, with Mark McGwire's and
Sammy So sa's pursuit of Roger Maris' single-season homerun record in 1998 ?3 Mark
McGwire was known as a slugger after he smacked 49 homeruns in his rookie season in
1987 for the Oakland Athletics? 4 He and teammate Jose Canseco were referred to as the
"Bash Brothers" for their muscle-bound, power-hitting ways. 25 In 1988, Canseco was the
subject of the first media speculation about a Major League Baseball player using
steroids but for the most part the general public was kept in the dark about any serious
suspicions of PED use in baseball. 26 Sammy So sa on the other hand began his career as a
light-hitting speedy outfielder. In 1992 he hit only eight homeruns, but after that went on
to have five consecutive seasons of at least 25 homeruns with the Chicago Cubs prior to
See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
It marked the first time since 1904 that a World Series was not played.
23
Greg Bishop, After Drug Revelations Redefining '98 Homerun Chase, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07 lOS/sports/baseball (last visited on May 14, 2013).
24
Mark McGwire Statistics and History- Baseball Reference, available at http://www.baseballreference.com/players/m/mcgwima01.shtml (last visited on May 14, 2013).
25
Jose Canseco,juiced: Wild Times, Rampant 'Raids, Smash Hits, And How Baseball Got Big, (2005).
26 See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
21
22
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the 1998 season. 27 The McGwire-Sosa homerun race of 1998 captivated the nation, as
they hit 70 and 66 respectively, and engendered much needed goodwill towards baseball
because of their "sportsmanship" throughout the summer.

28

Others were less enthused by

what McGwire and Sosa had accomplished in 1998.
According to a book released in early 2006, Game of Shadows: Barry Bonds,
BALCO, and the Steroids Scandal that Rocked Professional Sports, Barry Bonds was
convinced that the performances of McGwire and So sa were aided by steroids. 29 After
all a container of androstenedione (andro), a then-legal steroid precursor, was discovered
in McGwire's locker that summer. 30 Bonds, widely considered to be one of the most
complete players in baseball for almost his entire career, was jealous of the attention two
players inferior to him were getting because of their use of performance enhancing
drugs. 31 As a result, a player who had previously been clean for his entire career turned
to steroid use.

The book also contained reports linking Bonds to the Bay Area

Laboratory Co-Operative (BALCO), a San Francisco company that had been identified as
a major hub for steroids and other PEDs. 32 BALCO founder, Victor Conte, created
designer steroids which were so new that they were undetectable by drug testing. 33 These
were there ones used by Barry Bonds which enabled him to surpass Mark McGwire's
single-season homerun record in 2001 by hitting 73 homeruns and to break one of the
27

Sammy Sosa Statistics and History- Baseball Reference, available at http: //www.baseballreference.com/players/s/sosasaOl.shtml (last visited on May 14, 2013).
2s See Bishop, supra Note 23.
29 Mark Fainaru-Wada & Lance Williams, Game of Shadows (2006).
30 Joshua H. Whitman, Winning at All Costs: Using Law & Economics to Determine the Proper Role of
Government in Regulating the Use of Performance Enhancing Drugs in Professional Sports, University
of Illinois Law Review (2007).
31 Mark Fainaru-Wada & Lance Williams, Game of Shadows (2006).
32 See Whitman, supra Note 30.
33 Teri Thompson, As Barry Bonds goes to trial, BALCO founder Victor Conte finds redemption, success,
2011, available at http: //www.nydailynews.com/sports/barry-bonds-trial-balco-founder-victorconte-finds-redemption-success-article-1.139977 (last visited on May 14, 2013).
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most cherished records in all of baseball, Hank Aaron's Major League homerun record. 34
BALCO' s facilities were raided by federal agents in the summer of 2003 which resulted
in a grand jury probe of Victor Conte. 35 Bonds, who was linked to Conte through the
records seized in the raid, was subpoenaed to testify. Federal prosecutors believed Bonds
had perjured himself in front of the grand jury in December of 2003, by offering
misleading statements and lying about his personal use of steroids, and charged him with
obstruction of justice and perjury in November of 2007. 36 In April of 2011 Bonds was
found guilty of obstruction of justice, but a mistrial was declared as to the three perjury
counts he faced. 37 The judgment was considered a failure for the government because of
the expense to taxpayers and the squandering of resources which resulted in the decision
to not retry Bonds. 38
It became apparent to Major League Baseball that something needed to be done as

the league was seeing prodigious offensive numbers that had never been witnessed before
in the game, aided by performance enhancing drugs. In 2001, baseball instituted the
Minor League Drug Prevention and Treatment Program. 39 Under the program, minor
league players were prohibited from using, selling, or distributing drugs of abuse or
anabolic steroids. 40 Since collective bargaining did not apply to players in the minor
leagues, because they were not members of the MLBP A, baseball was also able to

See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
36 ESPN, Barry Bonds indicted on perjury, obstruction charges, 2007, available at
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3112487 (last visited on May 14, 2013).
37 ESPN, Barry Bonds found guilty of obstruction, 2011, available at
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=6347014 (last visited on May 14, 2013).
38 CNN, Feds: No retrial for Barry Bonds on perjury charges, 2011, available at
http: //edition.cnn.com/2011 /SPORT /08/31 /barry.bonds.no.retrial/index.html (last visited on May
14, 2013).
39 See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
40 See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
34

35

7

mandate in-season testing. The program implemented a system of random urine testing
for prohibited substances, subjecting each player to up to three random tests per year in
addition to any "reasonable cause" testing that might be justified in the case of any
player. 41 Two rounds of in-season testing were conducted on minor league players in
2001, resulting in positive tests for steroids in 9.1% of tests. 42 That program was used as
the basis for Commissioner Selig's 2002 proposal to the MLBPA for a major league
program.
The MLBPA and the clubs negotiated the terms of the Joint Drug Prevention and
Treatment Program as part of the 2002 Basic Agreement, and the terms of the original
minor league proposal include many of the same elements that are in place in Major
League Baseball's testing program today. 43 It provided for the possibility of mandatory
random testing of all major league players if more than 5% of players tested positive for
steroids during anonymous survey testing in 2003. 44 After that did occur, mandatory
random drug testing began in Major League Baseball in 2004. This was not a panacea as
player's began switching from steroids which were detectable in drug tests to those that
weren't, such as HGH. To remedy this, several changes were made to the drug program
in subsequent years. HGH was added to the prohibited substance list in 2005 and random
blood testing for HGH began in January of 2013, which was a huge accomplishment as
that also had to be collectively bargained. 45 The penalty for a positive test was also
tweaked. When the program first started the punishment was a 10 day suspension for a

See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
43 See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
44 See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
45 Scott Boeck, MLB: In season HGH testing, an eye on testosterone use, 2013, available at
http: //www.usatoday.com /story/sports /mlb /2013/01/10 /mlb-expands-drug-testing-programhgh-in-season-testing/1823607 I (last visited on May 14, 2013).
41

42
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first offense, 30 day suspension for a second offense, 60 day suspension for a third
offense, one year suspension for a fourth offense, and the penalty for a fifth offense was
up to the commissioner's discretion. 46 Now the penalty is a 50-game suspension for a
first offense, a 100-game suspension for a second offense, and a third offense results in a
lifetime ban from Major League Baseball. 47 A positive test for amphetamines results in a
25-game suspension, where amphetamines were not part of the original drug agreement. 48
The penalties for positive drug tests under the major league program are the strongest in
major U.S . professional sports leagues. 49 These changes were largely brought about as a
result of congressional hearings which put pressure on Major League Baseball, the
players, and executives from the player's union.
In 2005, congressional committees held several highly publicized hearings
featuring testimony from prominent sports figures due to growing public scrutiny. In
addition, congressional members introduced various bills in both the House of
Representatives and the Senate proposing government action to alleviate the problem of
PEDs in sports. 50 These legislative proposals called for mandatory testing of professional
athletes and would have removed any bargaining power or discretion from the hands of
the individual leagues, their executives, and their players' unions. One such proposal, the
Drug Free Sports Act, called for a federal drug testing policy under the auspices of the
Secretary of Commerce which would have governed all professional sports in the United

See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
48 MLB News, MLB, union agree to stricter drug testing policy, 2005, available at
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20051115&content id=1268529 (last visited on May 14,
2013).
49 See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
so See Whitman, supra Note 30.
46

47
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States. 5 1 Another proposal, the Clean Sports Act of 2005, would have mandated at least
five drug tests per year and attempted to put control of the program under the Director of

the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy. 52 Congress also invited several
baseball stars of the past and present to testify including Mark McGwire, Sammy Sosa,
Curt Schilling, and Rafael Palmeiro. 53 During the hearings, Mark McGwire stated that he
"was not here to talk about the past. " 54 McGwire later admitted to using steroids in
January of 2011. Sammy Sosa testified that he did not use steroids but also conveniently
had trouble remembering how to speak the English language during the proceedings.
Rafael Palmeiro infamously waved his finger in front of Congress and stated
unequivocally "I have never used steroids, period!" 55 Only months later, he tested
positive for steroids and served a 10 day suspension for a first offense of the Joint Drug
Agreement. 56 The hearings also included testimony from parents of two young baseball
players who committed suicide after abusing anabolic steroids. Don Hooton created the
Taylor Hooton Foundation for Fighting Steroid Abuse in memory of his son. 57 Dr.
Denise Garibaldi, a psychologist, and her husband Ray Garibaldi offered testimony about
their son Rob, who began using steroids at age eighteen and committed suicide while in a
steroid-aided depression at the age of twenty-four. 58 Overall, the congressional hearings
did not paint Major League Baseball and its players in a kind light.

As a result,

Commissioner Bud Selig charged former Senator George Mitchell with conducting an
51

Drug Free Sports Act, H.R. 3084, 109th Cong. (2005).
Clean Sports Act of 2005, S. 1114, 109th Cong. (2005).
See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
54 CNN, McGwire mum on steroids in hearing, 2005, available at
http: //edition.cnn.com/2005 /ALLPOLITICS/03 /17 /steroids. baseball (last visited on May 14, 2013).
55 You Tube, available at http: //www.youtube.com/watch?v=kAxo4pCITRM (last visited on May 14,
2013).
56 See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
57 See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
sa See Whitman, supra Note 30.
52
53
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independent investigation into the illegal use of steroids and other performance
enhancing substances by players in Major League Baseball.
While this move by Commissioner Selig appears to have been self-serving, as he
no doubt commissioned the Mitchell Report with the intent of appeasing Congress and
ensuring that the proposed legislation did not impact his autonomy, Senator Mitchell's
findings and recommendations have been utilized in the administration of the Joint Drug
Prevention and Treatment Program. Since the investigation was commissioned at the
behest of Bud Selig, Senator Mitchell did not have subpoena power. 59 However, he did
have enough influence with federal authorities that he was able to interview certain
persons who had dealt or administered steroids to prominent baseball players. These
individuals were compelled to talk with Senator Mitchell, as any deals they made in
cooperating with federal authorities would have been off the table if they did not speak
with or provide truthful testimony to the Senator. 60 The Mitchell Report named names
and identified ninety individual players who engaged in the use of performance
enhancing drugs. 61 One of the baseball players named in the report was Roger Clemens,
who up until that point was a sure fire Hall of Fame pitcher. Roger Clemens fervently
denied that he had ever used steroids and even testified in front of Congress to as much in
February of 2008. 62

The bipartisan House committee in front of which Clemens

appeared, cited seven apparent inconsistencies in his testimony, and recommended that
the Justice Department investigate whether Clemens lied under oath about using PEDs.
Clemens was indicted on one count of obstruction of Congress, three counts of making
See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
61 See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
62 NBCSports, Clemens, McNamee get grilled by Congress, 2008, available at
http: //nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/23119245 I (last viewed on May 14, 2013).
59
6°
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false statements, and two counts of perjury. 63 His first trial began in July of 2011, but on
the second day a mistrial was declared due to prosecutorial misconduct after prejudicial
evidence was shown to the jury. 64 The verdict from his second trial came in June of2012
when he was found not guilty on all six counts he faced in relation to his alleged false
testimony in front of Congress. 65 Again, as with Barry Bond's trial, there was public
outrage that federal prosecutors had wasted taxpayer money, in the middle of a recession,
in their failed pursuit of a conviction of an athlete who had lied about using performance
enhancing drugs.
In the years after the Mitchell Report was released, the game of baseball
witnessed a stabilizing effect in the amount of offense being produced league wide,
indicating that the Joint Drug Agreement had begun to achieve its desired outcome of
eliminating performance enhancing drug use in the sport. However, the newest steroid
scandal to hit baseball has shown that PED use is a problem that will likely persist well
into the future. On January 29, 2013 the Miami New Times reported the findings of their
investigation into an anti-aging clinic called Biogenesis. The report linked some highprofile players to the clinic, which was dispensing and distributing PEDs to them under
the direction of Biogenesis founder Tony Bosch. 66 In the months that followed it was
reported that up to ninety players were linked to the clinic through records obtained by
Michael Schmidt, Clemens Lied About Doping, Indictment Charges, 2010, available at
http: //www.nytimes.com/2010 /08/20 /sports/baseball/20clemens.html (last viewed on May 14,
2013).
64 ESPN, Mistrial ruled in Roger Clemens case, 2011, available at
http: //espn.go.com /mlb/story/ /id/6 768625 /roger-clemens-trial-judge-declares-mistrial (last
viewed on May 14, 2013).
65 ESPN, Roger Clemens found not guilty, 2011, available at
http: 1/espn.go.com/mlb/story/ lid /8068819 /roger-clemens-found-not-guilty-all-six-countsperjury-trial (last viewed on May 14, 2013).
66 ESPN, MLB investigating region in PED war, 2013, available at
http: I /espn.go.com/espn /otl /story/ lid /88849 55 /mlb-investigating-south-florida-ground-zeroped-war (last viewed on May 14, 2013).
63
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Major League Baseball from former Biogenesis employees. Some of the players named
in the report include Melky Cabrera, Alex Rodriguez, and Ryan Braun. 67 Melky Cabrera
served a 50-game suspension last summer for having elevated levels of testosterone in his
system. After being made aware of his failed test, he created a fake website advertising a
product which he claimed he used, unaware of the fact that it contained testosterone.
Major League Baseball investigated his claims, found them to be false, and suspended
him. 68 The Melky Cabrera saga initiated the investigation of Biogenesis by the Miami
New Times because his co-conspirator in the fake website scheme had ties to the clinic.
Alex Rodriguez, a three-time American League Most Valuable Player, was linked to
PEDs when the results of his positive test from 2003 was leaked to the media. 69 The test
in question was supposed to be anonymous, as this survey testing was conducted in order
to determine if Major League Baseball needed to institute a mandatory drug testing
program. 70 He admitted to using performance enhancing drugs as a result, but only from
2001 until 2003. This admission came prior to the news of the Biogensis scandal. It is
entirely possible that Alex Rodriguez has used steroids for his entire career which
enabled him to secure two 10-year contracts worth a combined $527 million. 71 It was
also recently reported that Alex Rodriguez purchased records implicating him in the
scandal from the same former Biogenesis employees that sold information to Major

67 Bob Nightengale, MLB sets sights on Braun, A-Rod, 2013, available at
http: //www.usatoday.com/story/sports /mlb /2013/03/19/ryan-braun-remains-calm-amid-drugfirestorm/2001581/ (last visited on May 14, 2013).
68 ESPN, Melky Cabrera eyed for failed plot?, 2012, available at
http: //espn.go.com /mlb /story/ /id/8282185 /san- francisco-giants-melky-cabrera-launched-fakewebsite-ruse-report-says (last visited on May 14, 2013) . .
69 See Elfrink supra Note 5.
7o See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
71 ESPN, Rodriguez finalizes $275 million deal with Yankees, 2007, available at
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3153171 (last visited on May 14, 2013).
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League Baseball. 72 Ryan Braun, the National League Most Valuable Player in 2011, was
going to be suspended for 50 games after an October 2011 test indicated extremely high
levels of testosterone in his system. 73 An arbitration panel voted to sustain a grievance
filed by Braun challenging the chain of custody procedures used in Major League
Baseball's Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program. 74 After learning that his name
was listed in the Biogenesis documents for services rendered, Braun claimed that he and
his lawyers had consulted with Tony Bosch while preparing the defense for his successful
grievance.

75

It remains to be seen whether these upstanding individuals will be

disciplined under Major League Baseball's Joint Drug Agreement.
It is important to note that federal authorities did not a play a role in uncovering

the Biogenesis scandal.

While Major League Baseball urged the authorities to get

involved, they took no action. A lack of subpoena power makes it extremely unlikely
Major League Baseball will discipline players involved in the Biogenesis scandal because
they have not tested positive under the Joint Drug Agreement. Major League Baseball
has yet to interrogate any of the players implicated in the Biogenesis reports but is likely
to in the near future 76 . If the players refuse to talk to MLB officials, the league can
suspend them per the bylaws of the collective bargaining agreement. Players could be
granted immunity even if they admit guilt to the use of performance enhancing drugs. In
this case, the players would have to fully disclose their arrangement with Tony Bosch,
including any involvement by their agents or knowledge of any other player who

NY Daily News, available at http: I /www.nydailynews.com /sports /i- team /sources-a-rod-boughtbiogenesis-documents-article-1.1315322 (last visited on May 14, 2013).
73 See Nightengale supra 67.
74 See Nightengale supra 67.
75 See Nightengale supra 67.
7 6 See Nightengale supra 67.
72
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received PEDs from him. 77 This could wind up being Major League Baseball's only way
to obtain evidence out of players listed in the records. While Major League Baseball did
purchase the records from former Biogenesis employees, without player testimony or a
positive test under the Joint Drug Agreement, any discipline the league plans to hand
down against MLB players or agents will assuredly be challenged by the Major League
Baseball Player's Association. It must be really frustrating for the league to have all of
this evidence that more than ninety players were involved in the Biogenesis scandal, yet
they will most likely be powerless to discipline these individuals. It behooves Congress
to become involved in the regulation of performance enhancing drugs in baseball as it
would benefit the sport, the players, and society at large.
The deleterious effects of performance enhancing drug use are wide ranging and
justify governmental regulation. The sport of baseball is a multi-billion dollar industry
and as a result would fall within the influence of Congress and the Interstate Commerce
Clause. Due to the complex issues that arise from steroid use in Major League Baseball,
Congress would be in the optimal position to finally eradicate the sport of PEDs. In order
to do so, Congress would have to remove drug testing from the grasp of collective
bargaining and put it within the purview of federal regulators. They could go about this
by amending the National Labor Relations Act to remove etnployee drug testing from the
list of mandatory bargaining subjects, at least in the limited context of professional
sports, and instead institute its own set of PED procedures and punishments. 78 Some are
loathe to have Congress attempt to get involved in anything, as they prefer small
government, while others argue that there should be no ban on performance enhancing

77
7B

See Nightengale supra 67.
See Whitman supra 30.
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drugs in baseball at all. This laissez faire attitude misses the point entirely as there is
indeed a performance enhancing drug epidemic.
The regulation of performance enhancing drugs represents a compelling
governmental interest and poses a public health concern.

The illegal use of these

substances to improve athletic performance carries with it potentially serious negative
side effects on the human body. 79 Steroid users place themselves at risk for psychiatric
problems, cardiovascular and liver damage, drastic changes to their reproductive systems,
musculoskeletal injury, and other problems. 80

Users of human growth hormone risk

cancer, harm to their reproductive health, cardiac and thyroid problems, and overgrowth
of bone and connective tissue. 81 Those baseball players who engage in steroid use don't
only harm themselves; they can also negatively influence the young athletes who try to
emulate them.
The nation's youth will always treat professional athletes as role models and as
such the impact of performance enhancing drug use by baseball players cannot be
overstated. Because adolescents are already subject to significant hormonal changes, the
use of steroids and other performance enhancing substances can have more serious
effects on them than they have on adults. 82 It is estimated that between 3 to 6 percent of
high school students engage in steroid use. 83 Even though that might seem like a small
amount, it means that hundreds of thousands of high-school aged youths are engaging in

79

See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
81 See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
82 Restoring Faith in America's Pastime: Evaluating Major League Baseball's Efforts to Eradicate Steroid
Use: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Gov't Reform, 109th Cong. 307 (2005).
83 See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
80
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the use of illegal PEDs. 84 Rob Garibaldi, who committed suicide after abusing steroids,
stated the following to his father Ray who testified in front of Congress, "I'm a baseball
player, baseball players take steroids. How do you think Bonds hits all his homeruns?
How do you think all those guys do all this stuff?" 85 Don Hooton, whose son Taylor
also committed suicide as a result of steroid abuse, stated the following in his 2005
congressional testimony "Our youngsters hear the message loud and clear, and it's
wrong. If you would want to achieve your goal, it's OK to use steroids to get you there,
because the pros are doing it." 86 If baseball players believe they need performance
enhancing drugs to make themselves better, then young athletes are going to assume the
same thing. Teens often focus only on the results, not the ethical dilemmas or health
problems by the shortcuts used to achieve them. 87 Health, both of Major League Baseball
players and young athletes, which represents the greatest concern is not the only factor to
consider.
Performance enhancing drug use in baseball poses a serious threat to the integrity
of the game and victimizes the majority of baseball players who remain clean. The
integrity of the game is called into question because we no longer know whether
achievements were accomplished through hard work or through artificial means.
Baseball records, which once held significant meaning, are now tainted as we often
cannot tell which players engaged in PED use.

This casts suspicion on all baseball

players, even the ones who remained clean and should be applauded for their hard work
and morals. A September 2000 study by the National Center on Addiction and Substance

See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
See Whitman, supra Note 30.
86 See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
8 7 See Whitman, supra Note 30.
84
85
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-- -- -------

Abuse observed that clean athletes face three choices: (1) compete without performance
enhancing substances, knowing that they may lose to competitors with fewer scruples; (2)
abandon their quest because they are unwilling to use performance enhancing substances
to achieve a desired competitive advantage; or (3) use performance enhancing substances
to level the playing field. 88 Not only are baseball players benefiting through their PED
use, as they are signing massive contracts and endorsetnent deals, the players that are
remaining clean are being significantly disadvantaged. Their statistics are being lessened
by the PED users, which reduces their potential to sign huge contracts and endorsement
deals. They may also be losing their livelihoods as dirty players may be taking roster
spots from them. Overall, the integrity of the game or lack thereof, has been severely
impacted by those baseball players who use PEDs.
It is clear that performance enhancing drug 1n baseball use has negatively

impacted the common good. The two most important values which are forsaken when
baseball players engage in steroid use include life and fair play. The lives of both the
athletes who engage in PED use as well as those young athletes who look up to them are
in danger. Fair play, which is essential to the integrity of the game is being challenged.
In formulating a moral analysis, which considers all of the relevant factors in eradicating
performance enhancing drugs from the game of baseball, it is appropriate to analyze the
work of natural law theorist John Finnis.

88

See Mitchell, supra Note 2.
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Part II - A Moral Analysis

John Finnis is an Australian legal scholar and philosopher, specializing in the
philosophy of law. He is known for his work in moral, political and legal theory, as well
as constitutional law. He is Professor of Law at Oxford University and the University of
Notre Dame and teaches courses in Jurisprudence, in the Social, Political and Legal
Theory of Thomas Aquinas and the Social, Political and Legal Theory of Shakespeare. 89
Finnis was educated at St. Peter's College and the University of Adelaide, where he was
a member of St. Mark's College.

He earned his LL.B. there, winning a Rhodes

scholarship to Oxford University in 1962, where he obtained his D.Phil. for a thesis on
the concept of judicial power. 90
His work, Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980), is regarded as one of the
definitive works of natural law philosophy.

It confronts moral skepticism by using

contemporary analytical tools to provide basic accounts of values and principles,
community and "common good," justice and human rights, authority, law, the varieties of
obligation, unjust law, and the question of divine authority. 91 In it, Finnis contends that
there are seven irreducible, fundamental, basic, universal goods or values. These are life,
knowledge, friendship, play, aesthetic experience, religion and practical reason. Finnis
maintains that each of the basic or universal goods or values are intrinsic goods, worth
having for their own sake, and not as a means of obtaining other goods. He believes that
it is self-evident that these are all equally and intrinsically valuable and that the pursuit of

89 The University of Notre Dame Law School, Staff and Faculty, available at
https: /llaw.nd.edu /directory/john-finnis (last visited on May 14, 2013).
90
Oxford Law Staff and Professors, available at https: 1/law.nd.edu/directory/john-finnis (last visited
on May 14, 2013).
9 1 Oxford University Press, available at
http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Lawlurisprudence (last visited on May 14, 2013).
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these values exhausts the ultimate reasons one could have for action. 92
Finnis also sets out the nine requirements of practical reasonableness that are the
basis for morality.

These are to form a coherent plan of life, to show no arbitrary

preferences amongst the values, to show no arbitrary preferences amongst persons, to
maintain some detachments from all the specific projects one undertakes, not to abandon
one's commitments lightly, to purse the good efficiently and within reason, to respect
every basic value in every act, to foster the common good of one's communities, and to
act in accordance with one's conscience. In order to pursue one's own good successfully,
one must satisfy these requirements. All the requirements are interrelated and are capable
of being regarded as aspects of one another. Not every one of the nine requirements has a
direct role in every moral judgment, but some moral judgments do sum up the bearing of
all of the nine requirements of practical reasonableness. Every moral judgment sums up
the bearing of one or more of the requirements and each of the requirements can be
thought of as a mode of moral obligation or responsibility. 93
The first requirement of practical reasonableness is a coherent life plan. Basic
aspects of human well-being are discernible only to one who thinks about his
opportunities, and thus are realizable only by one who intelligently directs, focuses, and
controls his urges, inclinations, and impulses. In order to fulfill effective commitments, it
is unreasonable to live merely from moment to moment, following immediate cravings or
just drifting from one commitment to the other. 94 Finnis states that it is irrational to
devote one's attention exclusively to specific projects which can be carried out
completely by simply deploying defined means to defined objectives. It is necessary for
92
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individuals to have both direction and control over their impulses in the undertaking of
specific projects. Individuals also require the redirection of inclinations, the reformation
of habits, the abandonment of old projects for the adoption of new ones, and the overall
harmonization of all of one's deep commitments. 95
Finnis states that we should see our life as one whole, the activities of one rational
subject spread out in time. He uses the Christian parable of the man who devoted all his
energies to gathering riches, with a view to nothing more than drinking and eating them
up as an example of a folly and how not to live. 96 Finnis would criticize those baseball
players who engage in the use of performance enhancing drugs simply to boost their
numbers in an effort to sign a big money contract or earn huge endorsement deals. He
would say that these individuals are clearly not controlling their impulses and are being
unreasonable in that they are living from moment to moment and being driving by
immediate cravings of fame and fortune. If these baseball players were viewing their
lives as a whole instead of in the moment they would realize they were being irrational by
using PEDs.

Not only would they be risking their health and happiness given the

deleterious effects of prolonged steroid use, they would also be risking their reputation
which could be tarnished if their drug use became public knowledge. Instead of simply
using steroids to improve their performance and become wealthy, baseball players should
utilize a coherent life plan through constant mental and physical training. This would
allow them to harmonize their commitments to their team, the public who view them as
role models, as well as to their families and themselves.
The second requirement of practical reasonableness is that there must be no
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arbitrary preferences amongst values. "Arbitrary" is the key word in this portion of his
theory. Finnis recognizes that any commitment to a coherent life plan is going to involve
some degree of concentration on one or some of the basic forms of good, at the expense,
temporarily or permanently, of other forms of good. "It will be unreasonable if it is on
the basis of a devaluation of any of the basic forms of human excellence, or if it is on the
basis of an overvaluation of such merely derivative and supporting or instrumental goods
as wealth or 'opportunity' or of such merely secondary and conditionally valuable goods
as reputation or pleasure." 97 Finnis uses the example of a scholar, who has little interest
in friendship, and how it would be unreasonable for him to deny that friendship, in and of
itself, is good even though that scholar has no taste for friendship. By espousing this,
Finnis rejects John Rawls's "thin theory of the good" which states that, in selecting
principles of justice, only liberty, opportunity, wealth and self-respect must be treated as
primary goods. Rawls believes that one must not attribute intrinsic value to such basic
forms of good as truth, or play, or art, or friendship. 98 Finnis believes the "thin theory of
the good" to be arbitrary and as a result formulated the second requirement of practical
reasonableness.
In terms of performance enhancing drugs in baseball, athletes who use steroids
are overvaluing wealth and opportunity at the expense of reputation and pleasure, and as
a result are being unreasonable. Players who use PEDs do so in order to boost their
statistics, either to take them from an average level of performance and tum them into a
superstar or from a minor league or bench role and give them the opportunity to play
everyday. This PED use will ultimately impact their reputation and pleasure. At the
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same time these players are rejecting forms of good such as truth, play, and friendship by
seeking principles of justice espoused by John Rawls in the "thin theory of the good." By
using steroids players are rejecting truth and fair play because their statistics have been
artificially inflated through dishonest and prohibited means. In attempting to gain an
advantage, they have arbitrarily preferred wealth. While some players engage in PED
use to provide themselves with a greater opportunity, they are doing so at the expense of
other players who have not used steroids, thus foregoing friendship. The players who
have not used steroids and have gone about their business honestly ultimately have not
arbitrarily preferred some values over other ones. They would undoubtedly be upset that
they lost out on wealth and opportunity to those who decide to cheat. PED users who
have little interest in truth, play, or friendship would also be unreasonable if they were to
deny that truth, fair play, and friendship were good. Ultimately, it would be unreasonable
for them to deny that players who don't use performance enhancing drugs are better men
than they are which is in keeping with Finnis' second requirement of practical
reasonableness.
After asserting that there must be no arbitrary preferences amongst values, Finnis'
third requirement of practical reasonableness states that there must be no arbitrary
preferences amongst persons. Finnis tells us that we should not prefer one person over
another.

He goes on to state, "Another person's survival, his coming to know, his

creativity, his all-around flourishing may in any event be beyond my power to affect. But
have I any reason to deny that they are really good, or that they are fit of matters of
interest, concern and favor by that man and by all those who have to do with him?" 99 In
other words, an individual's well-being is not more valuable than another's simply
99
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because it is theirs. The only reason for an individual to prefer their well-being over
another's is through their self-determined and self-realizing participation in the basic
goods that reasonableness suggests and requires. When an allowance is made for this,
double standards and hypocrisy persist. The solution for this lies within the principles of
the "Golden Rule" and involves individuals putting themselves in their neighbor's shoes
and not condemning others for what said individual is willing to do to themselves.
"These are requirements of reason, because to ignore them is to be arbitrary between
individuals." Finnis goes on to state that, "Provided we make the distinctions between
basic practical principles and mere matters of taste, inclination, or ability we are able to
favor the basic forms of good and to avoid and discourage their contraries. In doing so
we are showing no improper favor to individuals." 100
This applies to the issue of PEDs in baseball because steroid users, and those
who defend steroid users, have been quick to point out that they were not the only ones
using during baseball's steroid error. The "everyone was doing it" defense takes away
from those baseball players who have not used steroids and are self-interested claims
meant to deflect blame onto others. There is no reason for steroid users to prefer their
well-being over those of others because they have not engaged in the basic goods that
reasonableness suggests and requires. They should put themselves in the shoes of the
clean players and see how they would like competing against individuals who were
cheating and trying to take away their livelihoods through prohibited means.
This also applies to the government in their pursuit of PED enthusiasts who
allegedly perjured themselves in regards to their steroid use.

Both Barry Bonds and

Roger Clemens represented potential big gets for federal prosecutors as they were their
100
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one's particular project the overriding and unconditional significance which only a basic
value and a general commitment can claim: they are the evil consequences that we call to
mind when we think of fanaticism." 101 Finnis' fifth requirement establishes the balance
between fanaticism and dropping out, apathy, unreasonable failure, or refusal to get
involved with anything. Finnis states that, "one should be looking creatively for new and
better ways of carrying out one's commitments, rather than restricting one's horizons and
one's effort to the projects, methods, and routines with which one is familiar." 102
Essentially, Finnis' fourth and fifth requirements could be summed up through the
way Major League Baseball has dealt with performance enhancing drug use in the sport.
Major League Baseball turned a blind eye to steroid use for over a decade because the
sport had seen an astronomical rise in revenue and attendance figures as a result of fans
who wanted to see star players hit homeruns. After it became abundantly clear that
Major League Baseball had cultivated this environment, they were rightfully skewered in
the media along with Commissioner Bud Selig. The sport then took several steps to rid
itself of performance enhancing drug use through Major League Baseball's Joint Drug
Agreement, between the Commissioner's Office and Major League Baseball's Players
Association. Most recently, Human Growth Hormone (HGH) was added to the list of
substances that MLB can test for. Major League Baseball has undoubtedly been vigilant
in its commitment to rid the sport of PEDs after abandoning that same commitment by
refusing to get involved in the steroid era. However, they are bordering on the verge of
fanaticism after the latest steroid scandal. Ryan Braun, who won an arbitration award last
year overturning his 50-game drug suspension on the basis that the chain of custody

1o1
102

!d. at 110
!d.

26

era's best hitter and pitcher respectively.

Bonds was found guilty of obstruction of

justice, but a mistrial was declared as to the three perjury counts he faced after allegedly
lying about his steroid use in front of a grand jury. Clemens was acquitted on all six
counts of lying to and obstructing Congress he faced after voluntarily testifying in front
of Congress about his alleged steroid use. This was done in an attempt to repair his
reputation, after he was named in the Mitchell Report.

In the wake of the recent

Biogenesis scandal, federal authorities have refused to take action. Since Major League
Baseball does not have subpoena power, the government would have to get involved to
get to the bottom of what actually happened.

Most likely, they are refusing to get

involved because of their failures in the trials of Bonds and Clemens. However, this
could set a double standard as the government could be perceived as going after the big
fish and letting the little fish swim away. It could also be a sign of hypocrisy in that they
went after Bonds and Clemens on the basis of steroid use in baseball being a public
health concern. In turning a blind eye this time around they seem to be minimizing the
Issue.

Either way this would go against the third requirement of Finnis' theory of

practical reasonableness that there must be no arbitrary preferences amongst persons.
Finnis essentially combines the fourth and fifth requirements of practical
reasonableness. The fourth requirement is that one must have a certain detachment from
all the specific and limited projects which one undertakes. The fifth requirement is not to
abandon one's commitments lightly.

Finnis believes that there should be a balance

between being too attached to specific projects (fanaticism) and abandoning a
commitment before it reaches fruition. In regards to detachment Finnis states, "there are
often straightforward and evil consequences of succumbing to the temptation to give
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procedures in Major League Baseball's Joint Drug Agreement were flawed, was named
as one of the players in the Biogenesis scandal. As a result, Major League Baseball has
made it clear that they intend to go after Braun, and suspend him if possible, because he
publicly embarrassed them by beating his previous suspension. Finnis would say this is
fanatical and that it shows an arbitrary preference amongst the persons because MLB is
not as focused on the other players named in the Biogenesis scandal. The government
can also be viewed as abandoning their commitment this time around after previously
showing an interest in stopping performance enhancing drug use. Congress also has a
multitude of issues, far more important than PED use, on its plate right now which can
explain the refusal.
The sixth requirement of practical reasonableness Finnis espouses is that one must
bring about good in the world (in one's own life and the lives of others) through actions
that are efficient for their reasonable purpose. According to Finnis, "one must not waste
one's opportunity by using inefficient methods. One's actions should be judged by their
effectiveness, by their fitness for their purpose, by their utility,

and their

consequences." 103 Finnis rejects utilitarianism or consequentialism as a general strategy
of moral reasoning, stating they are irrational. What ultimately generates the conclusions
is always something other than the calculus: an overpowering desire, a predetermined
objective, the traditions or conventions of the group, or the requirements of practical
reason. 104
The government's failed cases against Barry Bonds and Roger Clemens cost
taxpayers millions of dollars and diverted resources which may have been better allocated
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elsewhere. If we were to do a cost-benefit analysis, it would be a no-brainer that the
government should have never tried these cases. At the same time they were trying to
show that no one is above the law.

There was substantial evidence that both men

perjured themselves, but the federal prosecutors proved to be no match for the high
powered defense lawyers Clemens and Bonds spent lavishly on. Of course a great deal of
this money came about as a result of their PED use, since they were able to flout
mortality and perform like superstars into their early forties.

Clemens also allegedly

perjured himself in front of a Congressional hearing that heard parents testify as to how
their children died as a result of steroid abuse. Finnis is correct in saying that the calculus
does not ultimately generate the conclusions. The government wanted to put an end to
the PED epidemic and make sure that more young people did not die as a result of
looking up to "role models" who used steroids. It could be said that they utilized their
resources efficiently because if they were going to try to bring down anybody it would
have been Clemens and Bonds. Major League Baseball will also have to deal with the
question of efficiency in their drug testing program in the future. While they are able to
test for HGH now, the cheaters will always be a step or two ahead of them. Wealthy
baseball players will continue to find a way to compensate brilliant chemists who can
create undetectable drugs. Something other than calculus will stop these players; it will
be the overwhelming desire of Major League Baseball to reach their predetermined
objective of having a clean sport.
The seventh requirement of practical reasonableness is to have respect for every
basic value in every act. One should not choose to do an act which of itself does nothing
but damage or impede a realization or participation of any one or more of the basic forms
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of human good. All acts should be done as a means of promoting or protecting, directly,
or indirectly, one or more of the basic goods. 105 The basic goods are: knowledge, life,
play, aesthetic experience, friendship, religion, and practical reason.
Using performance enhancing drugs completely goes against Finnis' seventh
requirement. By engaging in PED use, an individual does nothing but damage several of
the basic forms of human good. Steroid use would have a deleterious effect on life, fair
play, friendship, religion, and practical reason. While using PEDs may enhance aspects
of knowledge, play, and aesthetic experience Finnis could not condone this behavior.
Anything positive that may come out of this for the individual would go against the
common good. Steroid use would damage practical reason itself, because it does not
make sense to put something into one's body which could cut curtail one's life. Finnis
would promote regulating PED use because doing so would not damage any of the basic
forms of human good. Overall, Finnis would disapprove of performance enhancing drug
use because it violates the seventh requirement and practical reasonableness as a whole.
The eighth requirement is that of favoring and fostering the common good of
one's communities. Finnis states, "Very many, perhaps even most, of our concrete moral
responsibilities, obligations, and duties have their basis in the common good." 106 Major
League Baseball owes it to the baseball community which consists of fans, teams,
players, and the community at large to ensure that performance enhancing drug use is
eradicated. The common fan who has a great deal more to worry about than wealthy
baseball players shouldn't have to question if the product they are watching on the field is
tainted. They should just be able to enjoy the game of baseball, which is why baseball

105
106

/d. at 119
/d. at 125

29

players get compensated in the first place. Teams who spend huge sums of money on
players shouldn't have to worry that, what they thought might have been a safe
investment in a player, turns out to be a tremendous albatross of a contract after that
player's body breaks down after years of prolonged steroid use. The Yankees shelled out
$275 million over ten years because they believed Alex Rodriguez was a physical freak
who would continue to produce at an All-Star level well into his forties. Now they look
like complete fools because, as it turns out, Alex Rodriguez was probably using PEDs for
his whole career. Other baseball players shouldn't have to worry that they are competing
against cheaters, or that their teammate who beats them out for a roster spot has cheated.
Clean players shouldn't be tempted to engage in performance enhancing drug use
because they might not be able to compete at the same level as someone who is using
PEDs. Their livelihoods are being threatened because others are not competing fairly.
Parents should not have to worry that their child may tum to steroid use, because
professional athletes are doing so, and wind up dead or have their bodies break down at a
young age. Overall, Major League Baseball and the government will favor and foster the
good in one's community by trying to put an end to performance enhancing drug use.
The ninth and final requirement of practical reasonableness is that one must act in
accordance with one's conscience. Finnis says that, "one should not do what one judges
or thinks or 'feels' -all-in-all should not be done." 107 This ninth requirement flows from
the fact that practical reasonableness is not simply a mechanism for producing correct
judgments, but an aspect of personal full-being, to be respected in every act as well as
overall, whatever the consequences.
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If a player who engaged in performance enhancing drug use, acted in accordance
with their conscience, they would view it as wrong. Likewise, if a clean player were to
look into their conscience they would know that PED use is wrong, but they could feel
better about themselves in knowing that they took the higher road and made the morally
correct decision. Major League Baseball is on the right path of trying to get performance
enhancing drugs out of baseball.

They have met John Finnis' nine requirements of

practical reasonableness, which have produced the morally correct course of action.
Governmental regulation of performance enhancing drugs in baseball is also the morally
correct course of action. If Congress went through Finnis' requirements of practical
reasonableness like I did in this paper, they will conclude that legislation is needed to
eradicate the use of performance enhancing drugs in baseball.
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Conclusion

It is becoming increasingly evident that performance enhancing drug use in

baseball may never disappear.

This is due to the overwhelming desire by some

individuals to accumulate wealth and fame at the expense of the common good. By
taking this course of action they risk their own lives and the lives of others and remove
the element of fair play from the game of baseball.
The morally correct course of action dictates that performance enhancing drugs
should be eradicated from Major League Baseball. Whether the government will attempt
to regulate PEDs in baseball remains to be seen, but they represent the best hope of a
drug free sport.
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